We present an analysis of the diversity that exists in the rules and blacklisted IP addresses of the Snort and Suricata Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). We analysed the evolution of the rulesets and blacklisted IP addresses of these two IDSs over a 5-month period between May and October 2017. We used three different off-the-shelf default configurations of the Snort IDS and the Emerging Threats (ET) configuration of the Suricata IDS. Analysing the differences in these systems allows us to get insights on where the diversity in the behaviour of these systems comes from and how does it evolve over time. This gives insight to Security architects on how they can combine and layer these systems in a defence-in-depth deployment. To the best of our knowledge a similar experiment has not been performed before. We will also show results on the observed diversity in behaviour of these systems, when they analysed the network data of the DMZ network of City, University of London.
Introduction
An important part of design for security is defence-in-depth, consisting of "layers" of defence that reduce the probability of successful attacks. Guidance documents now advocate defence in depth as an obvious need 1 but their qualitative guidance ignores the decision problems. Crucially, these questions concern diversity: defences should be diverse in their weaknesses. Any attack that happens to defeat one defence should with high probability be stopped or detected by another one. Ultimately, diversity and defence in depth are two facets of the same defensive design approach. The important questions are not about defence in depth being "a good idea", but about whether a set of specific defences would improve security more than another set; and about -if possible -quantifying the security gains.
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are some of the most widely used security defence tools. Some of these IDSs are available open-source, and the most widely used open-source IDSs are Snort and Suricata. Both of these tools are signature-based and rely on rules to identify malicious activity. The rules identify malicious activity based on content, protocols, ports etc., as well as on the origin of the activity/traffic -in this latter case, the suspicious IP addresses are "blacklisted" and traffic originating from these IPs are alerted. Depending on the configuration of the IDS the traffic can be alerted but allowed, or alerted and dropped -the latter happens when the IDS is running in Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) mode.
In this paper, we present an analysis of the diversity that exists between the Snort and Suricata rules and blacklisted IP addresses. We analysed the evolution of the rulesets and blacklisted IP addresses of these two IDSs over a 5-month period between May and October 2017. We used three different off-the-shelf default configurations of the Snort IDS and the Emerging Threats configuration of the Suricata IDS. Analysing the differences in these systems and how they evolve over time, allows us to get insights on where the diversity in the behaviour of these systems comes from. To the best of our knowledge a similar experiment has not been performed before. We will also show results on the observed diversity in behaviour of these systems, when they analysed the network data of the DMZ network of City, University of London.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental architecture. The next three sections present results of diversity analysis of the following aspects of Snort and Suricata: blacklists (Section 3); rulesets (Section 4); behaviour on real network traffic (Section 5). Section 6 presents a discussion of the results and limitations. Section 7 presents related work and finally Section 8 presents conclusions and further work.
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Description of the Experiment and the Architecture
We ran an experiment for 5 months from 20 th May 2017 to 31 st October 2017. During these dates we did the following. We downloaded and saved snapshots of the blacklisted IP addresses of Snort and Suricata as they were on each day of the experiment. To retrieve the rules we used the pulledpork tool 2 . For Snort, the blacklisted files 3 were downloaded every 15 minutes for the duration of the experiment. We therefore have a total of 15,812 blacklist files for Snort. Note that the total duration of the experiment is 165 days for which there should have been 15,840 files, but in some cases there were no updates for blacklisted IPs in every 15-minute slot of our collection period. The blacklisted IP addresses for Suricata are located inside the rules files 4 , so we extracted the blacklisted IP addresses from these rule files. We also ran pulledpork every 15 minutes for Suricata, but contrary to Snort, the rate of updates of the Suricata ET blacklists appear to be on daily basis rather than every 15 minutes.
We downloaded and saved the rules of Snort for three different default rule configurations available from the Snort webpages (Community rules, Registered rules, and Subscribed rules). The difference between these rules are explained in the Snort 3 website 5 . In summary, the website states the following for these different rules: the Subscribed (paid) rules are the ones that are available to users in real-time as they are released; the Registered rules are available to registered users 30 days after the Subscribed users; the Community rules are a small subset of the subscribed/registered rule sets and are freely available to all users. For Suricata we used the Emerging Threats (ET) ruleset. We ran the pulledpork to update the rules every 15 minutes, but we observed that rules were updated on average every 24 hours. Similar to blacklisted files, we saved snapshots of these rules files on each day of the experiment. The University's IT team saved copies of the network traffic (in packet capture (pcap) format) for retrospective analysis of attacks and incidents. We replayed the pcap traffic collected over a one week From 2 May to 8 May 2017, to the three different versions of Snort outlined above and to Suricata ET.
The data collection and analysis infrastructure runs on a virtualized environment based on VMware VSphere data center. This data collection setup has five data hosts each having, 150TB storage capacity, 200GB RAM, and 32 x 2.3GHz of CPU processing speed. At the start of the experiment, we installed the latest versions of these IDSs on the FreeBSD operating system: Snort 2.9.9.0 and Suricata 3.2.1.
3
Diversity in the IP Blacklists of Snort and Suricata
Analysis of each individual IDS
In this section, we present the analysis of our research on how blacklisted IP addresses evolve over time in Snort and Suricata. As we mentioned previously, we obtained these blacklisted IPs from May 20 2017 to October 31 2017, at a sampling rate of every 15 minutes. We kept the same sampling frequency for Suricata to make the analysis as comparable as possible, though we observed that the rate of change of the blacklisted files was, in some cases, less frequent than every fifteen minutes for Snort and further less frequent for Suricata (which tended to be every 24 hours). Figure  1 shows the evolution of the blacklisted IP addresses as obtained from Snort (left plot) and Suricata (right plot). The y-axis shows the total count of the blacklisted IPs and xaxis shows the data collection points. From Figure 1 we observe a large fluctuation in the number of blacklisted IP addresses over time. For example around 21 June 2017 a large number of IP addresses were removed from the blacklists. However, afterwards, the number of blacklisted IP addresses increased again. In Suricata we also saw a large drop in the number of blacklisted IP addresses around this time, but the total number of blacklisted IPs did not increase again as it did for Snort.
We note that some IP addresses remained blacklisted for the entire duration of our experiment (or change their states only once, e.g., they are removed from the blacklists), whereas we observed other IP addresses that changed state twice or more (e.g. blacklisted, removed, blacklisted etc.) We therefore divide the IP addresses into those that remained "continuously" blacklisted IP addresses (or change their states only once) and "discrete" blacklisted IP addresses (those that changed state more than once). General statistics are given in Table 1 : the second column shows counts of the total number of files containing blacklisted IP addresses for the whole experiment period; the third column shows the total number of distinct IP addresses; the fourth and fifth columns show the counts of the "continuous" and "discrete" IP addresses. Figure 2 gives the distribution of total time blacklisted for all the IP addresses over the entire period of our experiment. We plotted the proportion of IP addresses (x-axis) against the total time a particular IP remained blacklisted (y-axis). We observe that IP addresses stayed blacklisted longer in Snort than in Suricata. 
Fig. 1. Count of Blacklisted IPs in Snort and Suricata in our collection period
3.2
Diversity analysis of the blacklisted IP Addresses We then analysed the similarity and diversity in the Snort and Suricata blacklisted IP addresses. We compared blacklisted IP addresses from the Snort and Suricata sources at exact time/date points (to the nearest second). In total, out of 15,812 Snort files, and 129 of Suricata, 128 files had a common date/time overlap. The analysis on this section is based on this overlap. Figure 3 shows the date/time slots for which the analysis was carried out (in the x-axis) and the counts of different categories of blacklisted IP addresses (y-axis). We have three main categories of interest: IP addresses which were blacklisted in Snort only (depicted as "_snort" in the graph), IP addresses which were blacklisted in Suricata only ("_suricata"), and IP addresses which were blacklisted in both Snort and Suricata ("_snort_suricata"). We observe that the overlap between the two blacklisted IP addresses sets is relatively small and the total number of IPs that appear in blacklists of both Snort and Suricata is relatively constant for the duration of our experiment. Table 2 shows the general statistics for all IPs and the data points in the dataset of 128 files of blacklisted IP addresses in Snort and Suricata. We have a total of 177,504 distinct IP addresses observed in either Snort or Suricata in these 128 files. Of these, 3,991 have been observed in both Snort and Suricata. We can think of each data point in our dataset consisting of an IP/date pair, and for each of these data points the value is either "observed in Snort-only" (abbreviated 01), "observed in Suricata only" (abbreviated 10), or "observed in both Snort and Suricata" (abbreviated 11). The statistics for these data points are given in the last three rows of Table 2. Table 3 then shows a more detailed breakdown for each of the 177,504 IP addresses. The first two columns show the totals count of IP addresses which in the observation period were observed in Snort only, Suricata only, or both in Snort and Suricata at the same time (these are depicted as "single state" IP addresses). The third and fourth columns show the total number of IP addresses in which we observed multiple states over the experiment period. For example, the first row shows that there are 79 IP addresses that were observed in both Snort and Suricata blacklisted files, but never at the same time. Columns 5 and 6 then show a further breakdown of these IP addresses depending on where they were observed first: for these 79 IP addresses, 35 were observed in Snort blacklists first, and 44 in Suricata. Figure 4 shows the IP addresses for which we observed multiple states (i.e. those of columns three and four from Table 3) . The x-axis shows the number of date/time points and the y-axis shows the enumeration of those blacklisted IP addresses. We kept the same ordering of the plots as the corresponding rows in column 3 of Table 3 : the topleft plot shows the 79 IP addresses that were either observed in both Snort and Suricata but not at the same time, the top right the 2,834 observed in Snort only, or both Snort and Suricata at the same time etc.) The bottom-left plot shows an interesting behavior for IPs that are either in Suricata or in both. From time to time it appears many IP addresses are being removed from Snort, before being reinstated again (we can see blocks of red (Snort and Suricata) becoming green (Suricata only), and then red again). 
Overall Analysis
In this section, we present results of the quantitative analysis of the diversity in Snort and Suricata rulesets. For this analysis, we collected rulesets of Snort and Suricata from 20 May 2017 to 31 October 2017. We considered the following Snort rulesets available from the Snort website: Community, Registered and Subscribed. For Suricata we used the Emerging Threats (ET) rulesets. Similar to blacklisted IP addresses, our sampling rate was every 15 minutes. However, the rate at which the rules were updated was much lower compared with blacklisted IP addresses: mainly every 24 hours, but sometimes with lags of 5 days with no updates. Snort Community rules are an exception where we noticed an update of 4 rules multiple times a day. We present the analysis from comparing the rulesets across all versions once every 24 hours. Table 4 shows the details of the data that we used for this analysis. The total number of rules for Suricata is double that for Snort Registered and Snort Subscribed (which are very similar), while the total number of rules in Snort Community is much smaller. Additionally, we looked at how the rules change. We noticed that for some rules the SID (Signature ID) remains the same, but the version number of that rule may change: columns four and five of Table 3 give these counts. More than 80% of the Snort Registered and Subscribed rulesets, and 97% of Suricata ET rulesets reported version changes during the experiment. Figure 5 shows the count of rules of each of these rulesets as they evolve over the duration of the experiment. We notice that the total number of rules in each set remains relatively constant for the duration of the experiment.
Snort Diversity analysis
Next, we look at a comparison of the rulesets of Snort. The SID along with the version number is a unique identifier for each rule, and they are used consistently across the different rulesets (i.e. the same SID and same version number in Registered and Subscribed means that the rule is also the same). Figure 6 shows the diversity in time among the Snort rulesets. The y-axis shows, in a log scale, the counts of rules in different categories for each day of the experiment (x-axis). "_reg" is the count of rules which are only in the Snort Registered set, "_reg_com" shows only those rules that in the Registered and Community rulesets etc. We notice that the majority of the rules are those that exist in both Registered and Subscribed rulesets (brown dots), followed by those that are common amongst all three rulesets (pink dots), and those that exist in the Subscribed ruleset only (orange dots). Tables 5 and 6 show a similar analysis to what we described for Blacklisting in tables 2 and 3, but now applied to the different rulesets of Snort. For the cases where we have multiple states per SID (e.g. changing from "Subscribed" to "Subscribed and Registered" etc.) we are showing all the combinations that have at least one SID (the total number of combinations is 2 7 but most of those combinations have not been observed in our experiment-i.e. there is no data for them). As expected, in cases where there are multiple states we tend to observe them first in the Subscribed ruleset. Figure  7 shows the time it takes for the Snort Subscribed ruleset to become available on the other rulesets (i.e. the SIDs in the sets: (10,100), (10,110), (10,110,111) and (10,11,110,11) from Table 6 ). The figure confirms what is stated in the Snort website for these Subscribed rules: most of these become available to Registered users on average 30 days after they are available in the Subscribed ruleset. 
Diversity Analysis of Snort and Suricata Rules
Suricata ET rules use different SIDs to Snort, so the comparison of Snort and Suricata rules was done using the "content" field in the rules. This field contains the "signature" of the malicious payload of a packet that is inspected by the IDS. Hence, the 'content' field represents the important signatures information for a malicious traffic that these IDSs are intended to detect/capture. Not all Snort and Suricata rules have the 'content' field so the analysis in this section is based on only those rules that have it (73.4% of the rules of Snort Registered and Subscribed have this field, 77.8% of Suricata ET and 97.7% of Snort Community rules have the "content" field). Figure 8 shows the diversity of Snort and Suricata rulesets based on the content field. Here, the x-axis shows the days and the y-axis the number of SIDs with content fields, in log scale. The shortcut notation is the same as previous (e.g., "_ET" represents the SIDs observed only in the Suricata ET ruleset etc.) The largest overlap between Suricata and Snort is in the rules that exist in ET, Registered and Subscribed rulesets (the magenta dotted line that hovers around the 100 mark in the y-axis). Tables 7 and 8 show a similar analysis to what we described in Tables 5 and 6 , but constrained to just the rules with the "content" field, and also including Suricata ET. In addition to the binary shorthands we used in Table 5 , we also use "1000", "1001" etc., to represent Suricata ET and their overlaps with the different rulesets of Snort. These tables confirm that there is relatively little overlap between Suricata ET and Snort rules. 
Diversity in the Behavior of Snort and Suricata
So far, we looked at the diversity that exists in the internals of these products and the way in which they evolve. In this section, we will analyse how this diversity in design manifests itself in the alerting behavior of these products when analyzing network traffic. We analysed 7 days of pcap data from 2 May to 8 May 2017. The data was captured in the DMZ network of the City, University of London. In those 7 days, we had 326GB, 330GB, 280GB, 252GB, 186GB, 204GB and 316GB of network data respectively. The breakdown of the traffic based on different types of protocols is listed in Figure 9 . We analysed this data using Snort and Suricata with the rulesets discussed so far (we used one snapshot of the ruleset for the analysis). Figure 10 presents the results. We used the same notations as in Sections 3 and 4 (e.g. "_et" means alerted by Suricata ET only). We notice that Snort Registered and Subscribed rules generated alerts of an order of magnitude more than Suricata ET. As observed in the ruleset and blacklisted IP addresses analysis from Sections 3 and 4, there is little overlap in the alerts of Suricata ET and Snort, which means these systems exhibit very diverse alerting behavior when analysing this traffic. 
Discussion and Limitations
The results are intriguing, and they show that there is a large amount of diversity in the rules and blacklists of Snort and Suricata. Whether this diversity is helpful or harmful for a given deployment depends on the context. The rules and blacklists alert for potentially harmful behavior that has been observed somewhere in the world by users of these products. In a different deployment, the alerts from some of these rules may not cause harm. For example, a service or port for which a rule alerts may not exist in that environment. Hence even if the alerts are for malicious traffic it is likely that this attack will not cause any harm in the systems of that deployment. The dataset we used in Section 5, real traffic that the University's IT team gave us access to, is unfortunately not labelled, so we cannot do a conventional analysis of sensitivity and specificity of these IDSs and their diverse combinations. We did share the findings with the University's IT team and they found the results interesting. Currently they use a smaller subset of Suricata ruleset for analysis. Interestingly, they mentioned that even if the alerts are for services that they do not run (hence would be harmless in their environment) they would like to know about them as it gives them insight on security exposure for services that users may request in the future, and also because they can use the alerts to check if they are precursors for attacks on other services that they value.
How can individual user organizations decide whether diversity is a suitable option for them, with their specific requirements and usage profiles? The cost is reasonably easy to assess: costs of the software products, the required middleware (if any), added complexity of management, hardware costs, run-time costs and possibly more complex diagnosis and more laborious alert sifting. The gains in improved security (from protection to attacks and exploits) are difficult to predict except empirically. This uncertainty will be compounded, for many user organizations, by the lack of trustworthy estimates of their baseline security. We note that, for some users, the evidence we have presented would already indicate that diversity to be a reasonable and relatively cheap precautionary choice, even without predictions of its effects. These are users who have serious concerns about security (e.g., high costs for interruptions of service or undetected exploits), and sufficient extra personnel to deal with a larger number of alerts. 
Related Work
The security community is well aware of diversity as potentially valuable [2] , [3] . Discussion papers argue the general desirability of diversity among network elements, like communication media, network protocols, operating systems etc. Research projects studied distributed systems using diverse off-the-shelf products for intrusion tolerance (e.g. the U.S. projects Cactus [4] , HACQIT [5] and SITAR 6 ; the EU MAFTIA project 7 ), but only sparse research exists on how to choose diverse defenses (some examples in [6] , [7] [3, 8] ).
A very extensive survey on evaluation of intrusion detection systems is presented in [9] . This survey analyses and systematizes a vast number of research works on the field. The main features analyzed in the survey are the workloads used to test the IDSs, the metrics utilised for the evaluation of the collected experimental data, and the used measurement methodology. The survey demonstrates that IDS evaluation is a key research topic and that one of the main benefits that IDSs evaluation can bring are related with guidelines on how to improve IDS technologies.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an analysis of the diversity that exists between the Snort and Suricata rules and blacklisted IP addresses. We analysed the evolution of the rulesets and blacklisted IP addresses of these two IDSs over a 5-month period between May and October 2017. We used three different off-the-shelf default configurations of the Snort IDS and the Emerging Threats configuration of the Suricata IDS. We performed the analysis to provide insight to Security architects on how they can combine and layer these systems in a defence-in-depth deployment. We also showed results on the observed diversity in behaviour of these systems, when they analysed the network data of the DMZ network of City, University of London.
The main conclusions from our analysis are: -There is a significant amount of diversity in the blacklists of Snort and Suricata, and this is maintained throughout our observation period. The amount of overlap between these IPs is relatively small. Depending on the adjudication mechanism that a system architect wishes to deploy, having access to a larger pool of blacklisted IP addresses may be beneficial to increase protection against a larger pool of malicious sources. However, if a user observes a large number of false positives from these blacklists at a given period of time, then diversity can be help to keep the false positive rate low (for example by only raising alarms only if an IP appears in multiple blacklist) until the vendors "clean up" the blacklists;
-We observe a significant amount of diversity in the rules of Snort and Suricata. When analyzing the rules based on the "content" field, only 1% of the rules of Snort and Suricata return a match. This indicates that these systems would alert on potentially very diverse traffic. This is indeed confirmed from a small experiment that we ran with real traffic from City, University of London. There was very little overlap in the alerting behavior of these products.
We have underscored that these results are only prima facie evidence for the usefulness of diversity. What is important is to assess these products in real deployment on their capability to improve the security of a given system. The results presented here will, we hope, provide the security architects with the evidence on the diversity that exists in the design of these products and whether this diversity remains as these products evolve.
As further work, we plan to investigate the diversity with IDSs and other defencein-depth tools in real deployments, with labelled datasets, to assess the benefits as well as potential harm that diversity may bring due to the interplay between the risks from false negatives and false positives. Currently we are investigating the adjudication mechanisms that can help balance the risks associated with these failures.
